Sony's makes a confusing catalog of gadgets that overlap or even cannibalize one another. It has also continued to let its product lines mushroom: 10 different consumer-level camcorders and almost 30 different TVs, for instance, crowd and confuse consumers. But offering customers a wide array of choices was fundamental to Sony's success in the past.
Apple, on the other hand, makes one amazing phone in just two colors and says, This is the best. yet it's tremendously customizable. With so much of the experience coming from the software, not the hardware, consumers aren't using a product designed for them; it was designed by them.
This is an especially powerful offering because it replaces the single moment of instant gratification—buying the perfect camera, TV, or phone—with dozens of such moments. Every time they install an app or download a song, users are getting a customized experience with an emotional impact on par with the one-time purchase of a product.
AN area where Sony has found success — and perhaps one that most crystallizes the transition from stand-alone consumer electronics into a digital, Internet-centered world — is video games. Sony marketed its PlayStation 3 console, for example as an integrated entertainment system that serves as a hub in the living room, connecting the Internet and television.
But Sony’s obsession with hardware has marred that strategy. A delay in developing the console’s Blu-ray DVD player forced Sony to push back its release. Sales suffered because the PlayStation 3 cost much more than rival models from Nintendo and Microsoft. Sony was also slow to move into the world of online games, giving Microsoft a head start.
A stronger yen is also partly responsible for the decline in exports. Sony’s gravest mistake was that it failed to ride some of the biggest waves of technological innovation in recent decades: digitalization, a shift toward software and the importance of the Internet.
One by one, every sphere where the company competed — from hardware to software to communications to content — was turned topsy-turvy by disruptive new technology and unforeseen rivals. And these changes only highlighted the conflicts and divisions within Sony.
With its catalog of music and foundation in electronics, Sony had the tools to create a version of the iPod long before Apple introduced it in 2001. The Sony co-founder, Akio Morita, envisioned as early as the 1980s marrying digital technology with media content for a completely new user experience.
It didn’t happen. Initially, Sony engineers resisted the power of the company’s media divisions. Then Sony wrestled with how to build devices that let consumers download and copy music without undermining music sales or agreements with its artists. The company went its own way: its early digital music players, for instance, used proprietary files and were incompatible with the fast-growing MP3 format.
By the time the different divisions had been corralled into cooperating, Sony had lost its foothold in two crucial product categories: televisions and portable music devices. It was late to flat-panel displays, as well as to digital music players like the iPod.
After disappointing sales, Sony pulled the plug on its answer to Apple’s iTunes, the Sony Connect online store, after just three years. It has not been able to offer up a comprehensive alternative since.
Apple does awesome software, leaves hardware manufacturing to the experts.
Samsung does brilliant hardware, stays nimble on software platforms.
Nokia does brilliant hardware, reaches furthest into emerging markets, but lost the software plot
The Playstation 3 is emblemic of all that is right and wrong about Sony; an elegant interface wrapped in a product that is expensive and under priced by Microsoft, who wisely went with cheaper technology that was already in development. Sony should take a page from Apple and become more of a software company; open up development for their gaming/phone platform to small developers - to be an iOS developer only costs $100. Think about that. Wonder why the Sony marketplace isn't busting at the seams? Put the Playstation DNA in everything; games on a TV, games on a bluray player, games on their phones, etc.
Essentially, when products are not yet "good enough" for most consumers, the best integrated designs win - like Sony's Walkman and Apple's iPhone. But as soon as products begin to "overserve" customers, the key to success is to shift to a modular design. The decision to introduce the App Store was one Jobs fluttered tooth and nail - and it was absolutely critical to the success of the iPhone, because it allowed software makers to multiply - and consumers to customize - the usefulness of the device.
Sony dipped once too often into the format wars
As Sony’s brand started losing much of its luster, the company found that it had a harder time charging a premium for its products.
Apple, on the other hand, makes one amazing phone in just two colors and says, This is the best. yet it's tremendously customizable. With so much of the experience coming from the software, not the hardware, consumers aren't using a product designed for them; it was designed by them.
This is an especially powerful offering because it replaces the single moment of instant gratification—buying the perfect camera, TV, or phone—with dozens of such moments. Every time they install an app or download a song, users are getting a customized experience with an emotional impact on par with the one-time purchase of a product.
AN area where Sony has found success — and perhaps one that most crystallizes the transition from stand-alone consumer electronics into a digital, Internet-centered world — is video games. Sony marketed its PlayStation 3 console, for example as an integrated entertainment system that serves as a hub in the living room, connecting the Internet and television.
But Sony’s obsession with hardware has marred that strategy. A delay in developing the console’s Blu-ray DVD player forced Sony to push back its release. Sales suffered because the PlayStation 3 cost much more than rival models from Nintendo and Microsoft. Sony was also slow to move into the world of online games, giving Microsoft a head start.
A stronger yen is also partly responsible for the decline in exports. Sony’s gravest mistake was that it failed to ride some of the biggest waves of technological innovation in recent decades: digitalization, a shift toward software and the importance of the Internet.
One by one, every sphere where the company competed — from hardware to software to communications to content — was turned topsy-turvy by disruptive new technology and unforeseen rivals. And these changes only highlighted the conflicts and divisions within Sony.
With its catalog of music and foundation in electronics, Sony had the tools to create a version of the iPod long before Apple introduced it in 2001. The Sony co-founder, Akio Morita, envisioned as early as the 1980s marrying digital technology with media content for a completely new user experience.
It didn’t happen. Initially, Sony engineers resisted the power of the company’s media divisions. Then Sony wrestled with how to build devices that let consumers download and copy music without undermining music sales or agreements with its artists. The company went its own way: its early digital music players, for instance, used proprietary files and were incompatible with the fast-growing MP3 format.
By the time the different divisions had been corralled into cooperating, Sony had lost its foothold in two crucial product categories: televisions and portable music devices. It was late to flat-panel displays, as well as to digital music players like the iPod.
After disappointing sales, Sony pulled the plug on its answer to Apple’s iTunes, the Sony Connect online store, after just three years. It has not been able to offer up a comprehensive alternative since.
Apple does awesome software, leaves hardware manufacturing to the experts.
Samsung does brilliant hardware, stays nimble on software platforms.
Nokia does brilliant hardware, reaches furthest into emerging markets, but lost the software plot
The Playstation 3 is emblemic of all that is right and wrong about Sony; an elegant interface wrapped in a product that is expensive and under priced by Microsoft, who wisely went with cheaper technology that was already in development. Sony should take a page from Apple and become more of a software company; open up development for their gaming/phone platform to small developers - to be an iOS developer only costs $100. Think about that. Wonder why the Sony marketplace isn't busting at the seams? Put the Playstation DNA in everything; games on a TV, games on a bluray player, games on their phones, etc.
Essentially, when products are not yet "good enough" for most consumers, the best integrated designs win - like Sony's Walkman and Apple's iPhone. But as soon as products begin to "overserve" customers, the key to success is to shift to a modular design. The decision to introduce the App Store was one Jobs fluttered tooth and nail - and it was absolutely critical to the success of the iPhone, because it allowed software makers to multiply - and consumers to customize - the usefulness of the device.
Sony dipped once too often into the format wars
As Sony’s brand started losing much of its luster, the company found that it had a harder time charging a premium for its products.
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